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tive if they are open to more than one
reasonable interpretation, one of which
is inaccurate.
In formulating and applying the stan-
dard, the courts have been careful to
preserve the concept of reasonableness
in the debtor's interpretation of a col-
lection notice. By rejecting unreason-
able interpretations, the courts have
ensured that the "least sophisticated
consumer" standard meets its dual pur-
poses of ensuring the protection of all
consumers, while also protecting debt
collectors from unwarranted liabilities.
Jackson Challenges the Inaccuracies
of the Collection Letters
In challenging the district court's
finding that the collection letters vio-
lated FDCPA Section 1692e(3), Jack-
son initially argued that the letters'
"overstatement" of the degree of his
involvement in the collection process
did not violate the subsection or any
other provision of the statute because
he was an attorney and the letters were
actually from him. However, the Sec-
ond Circuit rejected this argument by
recognizing the broad scope of Section
1692e and noting the possibility of up-
holding the lower court's decision even
if the facts of the case failed to establish
a violation of a specific subsection of
the statute. Consequently, the court
found that the district court properly
concluded that the collection notices
specifically violated Section 1692e(3),
as well as Section 1692e(10).
Initially, the court found that NCB's
use of Jackson's letterhead and fac-
simile signature on the letters was suf-
ficient to convince the "least sophisti-
cated consumer" that she was in direct
contact with an attorney, when actually
she was not. Accordingly, the court
found the letters to be false and mis-
leading in violation of Section 1692e(3).
Furthermore, the court found the
"least sophisticated consumer" would
believe that Jackson was personally
involved in her case because of the
letter's language. Because Jackson was
not involved in the daily operations of
the debt collection process, the court
held that he had violated Section
1692e(10) which prohibited "the use of
any false representation or deceptive
means to collect" a debt from a con-
sumer.
Finally, despite recognizing the need
for mass mailings in the debt collection
industry, the Second Circuit reiterated
the necessity for mass mailings to con-
form to FDCPA mandates. The court
noted that most mass mailings contain-
ing facsimiles of an attorney's signa-
ture would violate Section 1692e if the
attorney was not directly involved in
the collection of an individual's debt.
Unintentional Acts, Good Faith, and
the Award of "Additional Damages"
Jackson also objected to the lower
court's award of $1,000 of "additional
damages" to Clomon by arguing that
the award was an abuse of the district
court's discretion. In support of his
challenge, Jackson argued that his non-
compliance with Section 1692e was
unintentional and in "good faith."
Moreover, Jackson contended that he
approved of the collection letters in
reliance upon the "authoritative inter-
pretations" of the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) and the district court's
decision in Howe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y.
1988). However, the Second Circuit
found Jackson's arguments
unpersuasive.
Initially, the court rejected Jackson's
"good faith" argument by pointing to
the language of FDCPA Section 1692e
which clearly banned the type of letter
that Jackson had authorized for NCB's
use. The court also found that the
FTC's receipt of the letters without
disapproving of their content was not
evidence of the FTC's authoritative in-
terpretation and approval of the letters.
Despite acknowledging that Publishers
sent copies of Jackson's letters to the
FTC as part of an unrelated investiga-
tion of Publisher's compliance with the
FDCPA, the court placed weight on
Jackson's admission during a deposi-
tion that the FTC routinely received
copies of collection letters without
evaluating the lawfulness of those let-
ters. Consequently, the court admon-
ished Jackson for his claimed igno-
rance of the well-established practices
of the FTC.
Finally, the Second Circuit rejected
Jackson's interpretation of Howe. Al-
though the Second Circuit recognized
the Howe court's holding that a debt
collector could rely on creditor's records
in determining whether to send collec-
tion letters, the court found that nothing
in the Howe decision released an attor-
ney from making a determination about
a debtor's account prior to sending a
collection letter bearing the attorney's
signature. The Second Circuit con-
cluded that Howe did not release any
debt collector from the requirements of
FDCPA Section 1692e. *
Brian K. Wydajewski
Consumer Demand and
Product Utility Weigh In
Product Liability Action
Based On Defective
Product Theory
In Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc.,
997 F.2d 496 (8th Cir. 1993), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that in order for a plaintiff
to recover punitive damages, he must
show that a defendant's conduct was
outrageous or indifferent to consumer
safety. The court also found that in a
strict liability case, the jury should make
the ultimate determination as to whether
a product is unreasonably dangerous.
Furthermore, a defendant is entitled to
a jury instruction on the defense of
contributory fault if the defendant shows
that the plaintiff had general knowl-
edge that the product presented a risk of
causing the injury in question. Finally,
the court concluded that to admit evi-
dence of other accidents at trial, the
facts and circumstances of the other
accidents must be substantially similar
to the current case facts.
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The Bostitch Contact Trip Pneumatic
Nailer
The pneumatic nailer manufactured
by Stanley-Bostitch, Inc. (Bostitch) is a
hand-held tool that operates by using
the force of compressed air to drive
nails into material. The contact trip is a
spring-like part of the device located at
the tip of the instrument which dis-
charges a nail when pressed upon a
surface. A contact trip pneumatic nailer
releases a nail only if the trigger is
pulled and the trip comes into contact
with another surface. It does not matter
which one of these two actions takes
place first.
The contact trip nailer allows users
to drive nails into a surface by "bump-
firing," a technique which allows for
insertion of several nails in a row.
However, bump-firing creates the risk
that a nail will discharge if the user
inadvertently presses the contact trip
part of the device on a surface while the
trigger is pulled. The nailer may also be
used for "placement firing," a process
in which the user first places the tip of
the nailer on the precise location for the
nail, and then pulls the trigger.
Improvements for Consumer Safety
After first marketing the nailer in
1970, Bostitch became aware of inju-
ries sustained by users when when they
carried the nailer with the trigger de-
pressed and accidentally bumped an-
other person or themselves. In order to
minimize this problem, Bostitch rede-
signed the nailer. First, Bostitch en-
larged the handle of the nailer so that
the user could grip it without having to
touch the trigger. Later, Bostitch
changed the nailer from a contact trip to
a "sequential trip" nailer operating by
placement firing only. The redesigned
nailer eliminated a user's ability to
bump-fire and, as a result, decreased
the risk that an inattentive user would
accidently release a nail.
After discontinuing sales of the con-
tact trip nailer, Bostitch became aware
that numerous consumers were modi-
fying the sequential trip to make it a
contact trip. Bostitch then marketed a
conversion kit to ensure that injuries
would not result from improper con-
sumer modification. After realizing
that conversion kit sales were higher
than sales of sequential trip nailers,
Bostitch resumed selling the contact
trip nailer in addition to the sequential
trip nailer.
Injury Results From Use of a Bostitch
Contact Trip Nailer
In May 1987, Leonard Drabik and
Charles Daniels were constructing a
shed. Drabik's head accidently bumped
the tip of the Bostitch contact trip pneu-
matic nailer held by Daniels. The im-
pact caused the nailer to discharge, driv-
ing a nail into Drabik's brain.
Drabik sued Bostitch in the United
States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri in a products liabil-
ity diversity action. A jury awarded
Drabik $1.5 million in actual damages
and $7.5 million in punitive damages.
Bostitch appealed this decision to the
United States Court ofAppeals for the
Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit va-
cated the jury's award and remanded
the case for a new trial on the issues of
liability and compensatory damages.
Punitive Damages Require Finding of
Indifference To Safety
On appeal, Bostitch contended that
it was entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law on the issue of punitive damages.
The Eighth Circuit agreed, concluding
that a punitive damage award against
Bostitch was unwarranted. The court
stated that to receive punitive damages
under Missouri law, a plaintiff must
prove the following: (1) the defendant
knowingly placed an unreasonable
product in commerce; (2) the defen-
dant showed complete indifference to
the safety of others; and (3) the defen-
dant acted outrageously or wantonly.
The Eighth Circuit held that
Bostitch's actions in relation to the con-
tact trip nailer were not indifferent or
outrageous. The court relied on evi-
dence showing that Bostitch, upon re-
ceiving information about the problems
with the contact trip nailers, immedi-
ately took steps to make the tool safer
for consumers. These steps included
redesigning the nailer and providing
specific warnings in the operation
manual and on the product itself.
The court also considered Bostitch's
analysis of the risks associated with the
contact trip nailer compared to the util-
ity and advantages of the product.
Bostitch's investigations showed that
accidental discharges of nails were rare
compared to the consumer demand for
a nailer with "bump-firing" capability.
Furthermore, the contact trip design
remained the industry standard for pneu-
matic nailers during the time Drabik
was litigated. Bostitch's compliance
with this standard served to negate the
element of conscious disregard. The
court noted that consumer demand can-
not make a dangerous product safe, but
determined that an award of damages
requires complete indifference to the
safety of others. Absent a finding of
indifference and in light of Bostitch's
efforts to improve product safety, the
Eighth Circuit found that Bostitch was
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
on the issue of punitive damages.
Jury Determines What Is Unreason-
ably Dangerous In Products Liability
Case
In order to sustain a strict liability
claim against a manufacturer, a plaintiff
must show that the manufacturer sold a
product in a defective condition which
was unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer. Bostitch argued that the
court should adopt the consumer expecta-
tion test set forth in Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts
to define what is unreasonably dangerous
in a strict liability case.
Under the consumer expectation test,
a product is unreasonably dangerous if it
is in a condition not contemplated by the
consumer, or if it is unreasonably danger-
ous to an extent not expected by the
ordinary consumer with ordinary knowl-
edge. Bostitch argued that it was entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law on this
issue because Drabik and Daniels were
well aware of the risk of accidental dis-
charge and the product was not unreason-
ably dangerous beyond their contempla-
tion.
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The Eighth Circuit concluded, how-
ever, that the consumer expectation test
is not the clear standard for determin-
ing what is unreasonably dangerous
under Missouri law. The court fol-
lowed the precedent of the Missouri
Supreme Court which has been reluc-
tant to establish a strict definition for
the term "unreasonably dangerous."
Noting that the instruction which was
given to the jury contained a broadly
worded definition of unreasonably dan-
gerous, the court concluded that the
instruction was fair to both sides. The
court found, therefore, that the jury was
properly allowed to make the ultimate
determination of whether the contact
trip nailer was unreasonably danger-
ous.
Contributory Fault Defense Requires
a Plaintiff's General Knowledge
Bostitch further argued that it should
have received its requested jury instruc-
tion on the contributory fault defense.
Contributory fault is a complete de-
fense to a strict product liability action
in Missouri. In order to assert such a
defense, the defendant is required to
prove that the plaintiff knew of the
danger associated with his actions, and
voluntarily and unreasonably exposed
himself to a known risk. The defendant
must also show that the plaintiff's con-
duct caused or contributed to the dam-
age sustained. Bostitch maintained that
it proved these elements based on the
testimony and circumstances of the ac-
cident.
The Eighth Circuit held that Bostitch
should have received the benefit of the
contributory fault instruction. The court
did not agree with the trial court's con-
clusion that Drabik had to have specific
knowledge that his head was in the
precise range of the nailer. Instead, the
court found that a showing of Drabik's
general knowledge that the product
posed a significant risk of causing the
accident in question was sufficient to
warrant the instruction. The court found
that Bostitch proved Drabik had gen-
eral knowledge of the risk of accidental
discharge when using a contact trip
nailer. The court concluded that testi-
mony concerning Drabik's knowledge
of the product created a jury question as
to whether Drabik voluntarily and un-
reasonably accepted the risk which re-
sulted from his actions.
Evidence of Other Injuries Must Be
Substantially Similar To Evidence In
Case On Trial
Finally, Bostitch contended that it
was unduly prejudiced by the admis-
sion of evidence involving other inju-
ries allegedly caused by pneumatic
nailers. Drabik, however, maintained
that the evidence of other injuries pre-
sented at trial was substantially similar
to the accident in question and properly
admitted.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that
the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting extensive evidence of inju-
ries that were not substantially similar
to Drabik's. This evidence prejudiced
Bostitch and discredited its expert wit-
ness in the eyes of the jury. The court
held that the admission of other acci-
dent evidence is limited to those events
which are substantially similar to the
events in the case at trial. The court
determined that this limitation would
ensure that trials remain focused on the
accident which forms the basis of the
case. 4o
Nicole Rudman
Supreme Court Strikes
Ban On In-Person
Solicitation By CPAs
InEdenfieldv.Fane, 113 S.Ct. 1792
(1993), the United States Supreme Court
held that a Florida ban on in-person
solicitation of prospective clients by
certified public accountants (CPA), Fla.
Admin. Code Ann. r. 21A-
24.002(2)(c)(1992), violated the First
Amendment where the solicitation was
for a lawful commercial transaction with
truthful, non-deceptive information.
The Court found that the ban did not
directly serve the state's legitimate in-
terests of protecting consumers and
maintaining CPA independence.
Building a Client Base
Respondent Scott Fane, a CPA,
moved to Florida from New Jersey
where in-person solicitation by CPAs
was legal. Unable to effectively build a
new practice using other methods of
solicitation, he sued the Florida Board
of Accountancy (Board), challenging
the constitutionality of the state's ban
on in-person solicitation. Fane asserted
that the ban presented a serious ob-
stacle to a CPA attempting to gain new
clients because most businesses would
be willing to rely on the CPAs already
serving them.
The District Court for the Northern
District of Florida granted summary
judgment to Fane, enjoining enforce-
ment of the ban as applied to CPAs
soliciting clients in the business con-
text, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's deci-
sion.
Court Finds State's Interests Substan-
tial
The Court first established that in-
person solicitation by CPAs constitutes
commercial expression which is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. The
purpose of the First Amendment in the
commercial context is to safeguard
broad access to complete and accurate
information and to allow both the so-
licitor and the prospective client to
openly discuss their potential relation-
ship. The Court noted, however, that
unlike private speech, commercial
speech is linked inextricably with the
commercial arrangement that it pro-
poses.
Because the state's interest in the
underlying transaction gave it a legiti-
mate interest in the expression itself,
the Board was required to meet only an
intermediate standard of review to sur-
vive First Amendment scrutiny. The
Court followed the CentralHudson test
which required the Board to prove: 1)
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